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COMMENTS ON MENDEL
RALPH F. BiscHOFP*
When one is aware that Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.'
represents a four-to-three decision of the New York Court of Appeals
in the area of products liability, one is prepared to have confusion
added to an already existing confusion. For the student of the law in
this area, it is hardly necessary to detail the history of the law whereby
it has moved from a denial of any liability on the part of the manufac-
turer of a product to a consumer or user, either on the basis of lack of
privity in contract or lack of duty in negligence, to the present general
status of some degree of strict liability. Familiar milestones are
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,2 which created a duty of due care for
the benefit of a foreseeable plaintiff in spite of lack of privity with the
manufacturer; the concurring opinion of Justice Traynor as early as
1944 in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,8 in which he stated that the
liability of the manufacturer of a defective bottle for a personal injury
should be a strict liability in tort and not one in negligence or war-
ranty;4 and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,5 in which a unani-
mous New Jersey Court upheld liability for personal injury on the basis
of implied warranty without privity. Many more cases could be cited,
but the general result of this revolution on top of a revolution has been
some form of strict liability.
Many students of the law today are inclined to quarrel with deci-
sions which they consider unjust even though justified by precedent
and logic. They are in a hurry to reach what they consider an equitable
result. For them, the courts must act as a dynamic agent; the traditional
static quality of the law is minimized. From this standpoint of public
policy, it would seem that the majority in Mendel is clearly wrong, and
the minority, definitely right. Even when analysing the opinions as a
logical result of earlier premises or as mandated by precedent, the
minority have the edge. At least the majority decision was not that
necessary.
Since the majority of the Court held that the statute of limitations
* Denison Professor of Law, New York University, School of Law. BS., Wgesleyan
College, 1927; LL.B., Harvard University, 1930; MA., Harvard University, 1931; Ph.D.,
Harvard University, 1937.
125 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
2 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
4Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440.
5 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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had run because the action was considered one in contract and because
it admittedly had not run if conceived of as tort, the basic question is:
for this purpose, which is it? Glass doors were installed by the Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Company in the Central Trust Building of Roches-
ter, New York, in October of 1958. Due to an alleged defect in the door,
the plaintiff was injured in October of 1965. At the time of the consum-
mation of the contract between Pittsburgh and Central, the statute of
limitations was six years; an additional year had obviously passed. The
action, however, was brought within the tort limitation of three years
from the time of injury. Procedurally, the Court of Appeals was affirm-
ing the lower court's dismissal of that part of the action based on
warranty.
From the standpoint of precedents, a focal point of the argument,
it is submitted that the majority opinion is not only weak, but also
misleading. The emphasis is on Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp.,"
a 1953 decision of the Court, and the relation to it of the 1963 deter-
mination in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instruments Corp.7 In Blessington,
a child badly burned by a "cowboy suit," which proved to be danger-
ously flammable, was given the "benefit" of the six-year statute of
limitations in his action on implied warranty against the manufacturer.
Admittedly, any tort action would have failed because of a delay in
bringing suit after the injury. Goldberg was more complicated in facts
and procedure, but for purposes of comparison it is sufficient to point
out that a dismissal of a count in implied warranty was reversed in a
suit for the death of a passenger on an American Airlines flight against
Lockheed, the manufacturer. The alleged defective instrument had
been supplied by Kollsman Corporation. To counter the argument that
Goldberg established strict tort liability and thus overruled Blessington,
the majority in Mendel rely solely on its conclusion that this is not so. In
spite of some words to the contrary, the latter case stands for the propo-
sition that the cause of action remains a contract action in implied
warranty.
The majority opinion in Mendel is weak and misleading in the
discussion of these precedents because it neglects the mood and language
of Goldberg, because it omits the setting and arguments in Blessington
and, above all, because it fails to stress the difference in the concept of
products liability between 1953 and 1963. Judge Scileppi's majority
opinion admits that in Goldberg there is some language on "strict tort
liability,"8 but he fails to mention that this dominates the case, regard-
6 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
7 12 N.Y.2d 402, 191 N.E2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
8 25 N.Y.2d at 343, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
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less of whether the complaint is phrased in terms of warranty or tort.
Thus, Chief Judge Desmond's opinion in Goldberg stresses that, "[a]
breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of the sales
contract out of which the warranty arises but is a tortious wrong."9
Again, in referring to the California decision in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.,10 Judge Desmond stated that this "unanimous
opinion imposed 'strict tort liability' (surely a more accurate phrase)
regardless of privity."" Even Judge Burke, among the majority of four
in Mendel, said in his dissenting opinion in Goldberg that the "true
grounds of decision in a case of this sort lie outside the purpose and
policy of the Sales Act and must be evaluated accordingly."'12 What of
Blessington and its definite use of the statute of limitations in contract?
Although Judge Desmond's opinion in Blessington stressed implied
warranty and the contract statute, it is only in answer to the defendant's
argument that a warranty action is in reality one in negligence (my
emphasis), subject to the three-year limitation. In 1953 the question in
New York was not yet whether the liability was the consequence of the
sales type of warranty or was based on strict liability in tort. It was
either negligence or contract warranty. This is not only clear from the
general history of products liability litigation but also from the 1953
opinion. After disposing of various counts in negligence, the Court
considered the alleged breach of implied warranty of fitness for use, as
follows:
[The] motion to dismiss was on the theory that such a suit is in
reality one in negligence, and so should be governed by the three-
year limitation. We think the motion was properly denied, and
that the holding below was correct -that is, that although such
a breach of duty may rest upon, or be associated with, a tortious
act, it is independent of negligence, and so such a cause of action
gets the benefit of the six-year limit.., as being on an implied con-
tract, obligation or liability.'3
To repeat, what is omitted from the majority opinion in Mendel is any
recognition that the issue in Blessington, given the circumstances of
1953, was different from the issue in 1969. Goldberg in 1963 did hold
for "strict tort liability." With that new background, Blessington is no
longer a valuable precedent in products liability law.
Much of common law is a logical deduction from a proven or
assumed premise, but it is a truism that what one puts into a major
9 12 N.Y.2d at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
10 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
11 12 N.Y.2d at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
12 Id. at 439, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240 N.YS.2d at 597 (dissenting opinion).
1 305 N.Y. at 146-47, 111 N.E2d at 422-23.
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premise one can also deduce from it. It would seem that the majority
opinion in Mendel assumes that by 1969 the major premise in products
liability law is either/or; either the procedure of a particular jurisdic-
tion follows the line of warranties with the consequent application of
contract law, the law of sales and, often, the commercial codes, or else
the procedure and pleading omit any reference to the warranty fiction
in favor of outright recognition of strict liability in tort. However, a
third variation of a major premise exists in some jurisdictions, namely
that the action is one of implied warranty, but it is treated as a tort
which it originally was. As pointed out in the minority opinion of
Judge Breitel in Mendel, New Jersey recently applied tort limitations
in Rosenau v. New Brunswick"4 in spite of the fact that the basic New
Jersey law on products liability emphasizes breach of warranty lan-
guage.15 Clearly, if the New York Court of Appeals wished to apply
tort limitations, it could have done so in like manner.
Finally, and most important, whether Cecile Mendel should be
able to hold the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. liable more than six years
after the consummation of the contract between Pittsburgh and Central
Trust, but within three years after her injury, involves a matter of
policy. The history of liability against manufacturers for original de-
fects has followed a tortuous path from the period when the chief ques-
tion was whether there was any liability without privity to the present-
day when specific results are determined by whether the liability is in
tort or contract. Under either theory much of the rationale depends on
what ought to be. The long-time advocate of strict tort liability for per-
sonal injuries, Justice Roger Traynor of California, analysed the policy
elements as early as his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co.' and particularly in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.Y The manufacturer can most easily distribute the cost of insurance
among the general public; under modem economic conditions the
manufacturer is definitely tied to the consumer, particularly through
advertising; the dealer or retailer is part of a network to accomplish
sales; responsibility on the part of the manufacturer usually avoids
multiplicity of actions. Similar considerations are to be found in leading
cases emphasizing warranty, such as Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.18 In addition, the purpose and policy of a Sales Act or Commercial
Code is far removed from the grounds of decision in products liability.
14 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
15 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 82 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
18 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion).
17 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
18 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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Granted that policy considerations have engendered strict liability,
whether in contract or tort, there remains the question of how policy
should affect time limitations on commencing a suit. As indicated, a
court may use the language of implied warranty and at the same time
recognize that a plaintiff not in privity with the manufacturer can
hardly be expected to sue until he has been injured. Here, again, the
minority opinion in Mendel arrives at the more just result, both in
theory and practice. Mrs. Mendel was not injured by her passage
through the glass doors until seven years after completion of the con-
tract; she sued within the tort limitation of three years after the injury.
The majority are willing to sacrifice the small percentage of meritorious
claims in order to prevent "unfounded suits ... ad infinitum."'1 How-
ever, how many injury-causing defects occur long after a contract? The
plaintiff still has the task of proving the defect and causation. The
longer the time, the less likely is it that he can get to or convince the
jury. Is it not unjust to deny an injured party compensation on the
arbitrary basis of the passage of time when completely unconnected
with any laches on the part of the plaintiff? The question is almost
rhetorical.
In summary, neither from the standpoint of necessary precedent or
logical analysis or equity can the opinion of the majority that the mere
passage of time has barred Mrs. Mendel's action for personal injury be
considered satisfactory. Perhaps this was the sole common denominator
which could produce a majority. Perhaps strict liability in any form
should not be extended to this type of accident. But, that is another
question.
19 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.YS.2d at 495.
1970] MENDEL
